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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S START PROPOSAL - Pro jec t ed  U.S./U.S.S.R. B a l l i s t i c  M i s s i l e  Forces* 
During h i s  address  a t  t h e  Eureka Col lege ,  on May 9 ,  1982, P r e s i d e n t  Reagan 
summarized t h e  s t r a t e g i c  weapons p lan  t o  be proposed by h i s  Adminis t ra t ion  t o  
t h e  Sovie t  Union during forthcoming - STra teg ic  Arms Reduct ion Ta lks  (START). 
Reportedly,  under t he  f i r s t  phase of t h e  P r e s i d e n t ' s  START proposa l ,  t h e  
Sov ie t  Union and t h e  United S t a t e s  would be l im i t ed  t o  about 5,000 warheads on 
no more than 850 i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l  land-based and sea-based m i s s i l e s  (ICBMs and 
SLBMs). Within t h e  aggrega te  l i m i t  of 850 b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s ,  n e i t h e r  s i d e  
could have more than 2,500 warheads on land-based I C B M s .  Reductions from the  
c u r r e n t  i n v e n t o r i e s  of deployed weapons would t ake  p l a c e  over a  5-to-10 year  
per iod.  (Presented i n  Figure I a r e  graphic  i l l u s t r a t i o n s  of t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  of 
ICBMs versus  SLBMs allowed, and t h e  t r adeo f f  s permi t ted  between t h e  agg rega t e  
number of ICBM-launched and SLBM-launched r een t ry  v e h i c l e s . )  
Under t h e  second phase, t h e  implementation of which would be decided du r ing  
t h e  forthcoming START nego t i a t i ons ,  t he  aggrega te  m i s s i l e  "throw weight " of both 
na t ions  would be almost equa l ized .  The United S t a t e s  w i l l  propose t o  t h e  Sov ie t  
Union t h a t  t he  c e i l i n g  on aggregate  ICBM throw weight i s  t o  be no l a r g e r  than 
t h e  aggrega te  throw weight of t h e  p re sen t  U.S. I C B M  f o r c e .  
P ro j ec t ed  U.S. and Soviet  B a l l i s t i c  Missile Force S t r u c t u r e s  
There a r e  many p o s s i b l e  numerical combinations between types  of I C B M s  and 
SLBMs t h a t  can y i e l d  r e s u l t s  which s a t i s f y  t he  proposed c e i l i n g s  on b a l l i s t i c  
missiles and warheads. However, t h e  U.S. b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e  f o r c e  s t r u c t u r e s  
* Prepared by A. A. T ina j e ro ,  S p e c i a l i s t  i n  Na t iona l  Defense 
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that meet the ceilings depend on the number of M-X ICBMs and Trident I1 SLBMS 
that would be deployed and on the number of warheads each of these missiles 
would carry. 
Shown in Table I and Table I1 are projections of U.S. ballistic missile 
force structures with a 100 M-X ICBM force and 200 M-X ICBM force, respectively. 
These projections serve to illustrate some of the more plausible ballistic mis- 
sile force structures that the U.S. could eventually develop under the Reagan 
START proposal once M-X and Trident I1 deployments are complete. To enable the 
reader to readily compare the U.S. and Soviet force structures, Tables I and 
11 include the projected Soviet ballistic missile force structure. Tables A-I 
through A-IV, presented in Appendix A, illustrate how the transition could 
occur from the current U.S. and Soviet forces to the force structures projected 
in Table I. 
Graphic comparisons of the projected inventories of ballistic missiles and 
warheads that would be possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union are 
shown in Figures I1 and 111. 
The following assumptions are used in making the projections: 
o Reductions in the number of ICBMs and SLBMs from those currently 
deployed would begin in 1984. 
o The ceilings of 850 ballistic missiles and aggregate of 5,000 warheads 
would have to be met by the end of 1988. 
o Deployment of the M-X ICBM and the Trident I1 SLBM would take place 
(on schedule) in 1986 and 1989. 
o Each M-X ICBM and Trident I1 SLBM would be deployed with 10 warheads. 
TABLE I - ESTIMATED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES 
UNDER THE REAGAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL 




70 Minuteman I11 (3 MK-12) 210 
300 Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12A) 900 
loo M-X (10 MK-12A)1/ - 1000 
- 
Sub-Totals 470 2 110 
SLBMs : 
288 Trident I1 (10 MK-12A)1/ - 2880 







300 SS-19 (6 Warheads) 1800 
70 SS-18 (10 warheads) 700 
60 SS-N-20 2/ 600 
(on 3 T ~ H O O N  SSBNs)3/ -
240 SS-N-18 41 1680 
(on 15 D ~ T A  111s) 
64 SS-N-17 5/ 6 4 
(on 4 SS~N-XS) 
108 SS-N-8 51 108 
- (on 9 DELTA IS) - 
1/ The number of warheads each M-X ICBM and Trident I1 SLBM would carry under 
the ~ e a ~ a n  START proposal has not been disclosed by the Department of Defense. In 
the projection shown, it is assumed each missile would carry carry 10 MK-12A warheads. 
21 Assumes 10 warheads per missile. - 
31 The Soviets could deploy more TYPHOON SSBNs than shown. However, to do so 
they f;ould have to retire some additional DELTA-class SSBNs not to exceed the aggre- 
gate number of SLBMs and SLBM-launched RVs. Also, the Soviets could deploy a new 
submarine (SSBN-X, equipped with 16 SS-N-17 SLBMs) to replace DELTA I and DELTA I1 
SSBNs. Herein it is assumed that DELTA I1 SSBNs (not shown in the table) have been 
replaced by SSBN-Xs. 
41 Assumes seven warheads per missile. - 
5 1  Assumes one warhead per missile. - 
TABLE I1 - ESTIMATED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES 
UNDER THE REAGAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSAL 




300 Minuteman 111 ( 3  MI(-12A) 900 300 SS-19 ( 6  Warheads) 1800 
200 M-X ( 8  ABRVs)6/ - 1600 70 SS-18 (10 Warheads) 700 
Sub-Totals 500 2500 370 2500 
SLBMs : 
144 T r i d e n t  I1 (6 ABRVs)6/ - 864 60 SS-N-20 7 1  600 
(on 6 O H I O  SSBNs) (on 3 TYFHOON SSBNs)8/ -
192 T r i d e n t  I ( 8  Warheads) 1536 240 SS-N-18 9 /  1680 
(on 12 LAFAYETTE SSBNs) (on 1 5  D ~ L T A  111s) '  
64 SS-N-17 101 6 4 
(on 4 SSE-XS) 
108 SS-N-8 101  108 
- - (on 9 DETA I s )  
Sub-Totals 336 2400 472 2452 
TOTALS 83 6 4900 842 4952 
6 /  The number of warheads each M-X ICBM and T r i d e n t  I1 SLBM would c a r r y  under  
t h e  ~ e a ~ a n  START p r o p o s a l  h a s  n o t  been d i s c l o s e d  by t h e  Department of Defense.  I n  
t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  shown, i t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e  M-X would c a r r y  8 Advanced B a l l i s t i c  
Reen t ry  V e h i c l e s  (ABRVs) and t h e  T r i d e n t  I1 would c a r r y  6 ABRVs.  
71 Assumes 10 warheads pe r  m i s s i l e .  - 
81 The S o v i e t s  could  dep loy  more TYPHOON SSBNs t h a n  shown. However, t o  do s o  
t h e y  would have t o  r e t i r e  some a d d i t i o n a l  DSLTA-class SSBNs n o t  t o  exceed t h e  aggre-  
g a t e  number of SLBMs and SLBM-launched R V s .  Also,  t h e  S o v i e t s  cou ld  dep loy  a new 
submarine (SSBN-X, equipped w i t h  1 6  SS-N-17 SLBMs) t o  r e p l a c e  DELTA I and DELTA I1 
SSBNs. Herein  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  DELTA 11 SSBNs ( n o t  shown i n  t h e  t a b l e )  have been 
r e p l a c e d  by SSBN-Xs. 
91 Assumes seven warheads p e r  m i s s i l e .  - 
101  Assumes one warhead p e r  m i s s i l e .  - 
FIGURE I1 - PROJECTED U.S./U.S.S.R. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES 
UNDER THE REAGAN START PROPOSAL 
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Some Major Goals of the Reagan START Plan 
Some of the major goals that the Administration expects its START proposal 
to achieve are: 111 -
o Permit the U.S. to develop and possess sufficient military capability 
to deter the Soviet Union and to execute the U.S. national military 
strategy, taking into account the military capability that would be 
allowed the Soviet Union. 
o Establish equality in the provisions of any future strategic arms limi- 
tation agreement. 
o Promote strategic stability by reducing the vulnerability of U.S. stra- 
tegic forces. 
o Establish effective verification with the necessary counting rules, col- 
lateral constraints, and cooperative measures. 
o Substantially reduce the number of currently deployed strategic nuclear 
weapons to equal ceilings. 
Major Critical Views of the Reagan START Proposal 
Some of the major critical views of the Reagan START proposal are that: 
o The Administration has not stated ceilings on sea-launched cruise 
missiles (SLCMs), air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMS), and bombers. 
o The Soviets probably will not agree to scrap 1,498 of their 2,348 
ballistic missiles while the U.S. scraps only 770. 
o The Administration has not presented a way to verify either the number 
of Soviet ballistic missiles or warheads to be limited under its proposal. 
o Unless the entire U.S. ICBM force is retired or the Trident I1 missile 
is armed with a small number of warheads, the U.S. would probably have 
a relatively small number of ballistic missile-launching submarines 
which could become vulnerable to Soviet anti-submarine warfare (ASW). 
o The 5,000 warhead ceiling could create an incentive toward a breakout of 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. 
o The proposal itself does not alleviate the U.S. ICBM vulnerability pro- 
blem. (Under the proposal, M-X missiles need to be deployed in a surviva- 
ble basing mode in order to close the "window of vulnerability.") 
111 Haig, Alexander, Secretary of State. The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. - 
Current Policy No. 389. May 11, 1982. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, Washington, D.C. 
The ICBM S u r v i v a b i l i t y  I s s u e  
Of t h e  i s s u e s  r a i s e d  by t h e  Reagan START p r o p o s a l ,  ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y  i s  
b o t h  t h e  most c o n t r o v e r s i a l  and c r i t i c a i .  The d i s c u s s i o n  below p r o v i d e s  some 
i n f o r m a t i o n  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h i s  d e b a t e .  
Under t h e  Reagan START p r o p o s a l ,  t h e  Uni ted  S t a t e s  and S o v i e t  Union cou ld  
each have 2,500 ICBM-launched warheads.  Many e x p e r t s  b e l i e v e  t h e s e  warheads 
would p o s s e s s  a  h a r d  t a r g e t  c a p a b i l i t y .  I f  t h i s  b e l i e f  i s  c o r r e c t ,  t h e n  
(depending on how t h e  I C B M s  a r e  b a s e d )  b o t h  t h e  U.S. and t h e  S o v i e t  ICBM f o r c e s  
could  be  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  a t t a c k  by b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e s .  
The v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  U.S. and S o v i e t  I C B M  f o r c e s  p r o j e c t e d  i n  T a b l e  I 
i s  h i g h l y  dependent on how t h e y  a r e  based.  The A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  h a s  n o t  y e t  
dec ided  how t o  base  ICBMs i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  Analyzed below a r e  t h r e e  o p t i o n s  f o r  
I C B M  bas ing :  ( 1 )  f i x e d  deployment i n  e x i s t i n g  s i l o s ;  ( 2 )  d e c e p t i v e  deployment 
among e x i s t i n g  s i l o s ;  and,  ( 3 )  deployment i n  t h e  " c l o s e l y  spaced  b a s i n g  system" 
(CSB) -- p o p u l a r l y  known a s  "dense pack" -- now proposed f o r  t h e  M-X. - 121 
Opt ion ( 1 )  - I f  bo th  s i d e s  deployed t h e i r  I C B M s  i n  c u r r e n t l y  e x i s t i n g  
s i l o s ,  and a l l  empty s i l o s  were d i s m a n t l e d  t o  s i m p l i f y  v e r i f i c a t i o n ,  t h e  S o v i e t s  
cou ld  t a r g e t  940 o f  t h e i r  2 ,500 ICBM-launched warheads a g a i n s t  t h e  470 U.S. 
I C B M s ,  and t h e  U.S. could  t a r g e t  740 of i t s  2,500 ICBM-launched warheads a g a i n s t  
t h e  370 S o v i e t  ICBMs. For  t h o s e  who b e l i e v e  t h a t  U.S. and S o v i e t  ICBMs p o s s e s s  
12/ The l a t e s t  A i r  Force  p r o p o s a l  f o r  b a s i n g  t h e  M-X i s  t o  d e p l o y  t h e  mis- 
s i l e s i n  c l o s e l y  spaced (1 ,800  f e e t  a p a r t )  s i l o s  w i t h i n  a  t r i a n g u l a r  a r e a  of 
about  12  square  m i l e s .  Each m i s s i l e  s i l o ,  c a p a b l e  of  w i t h s t a n d i n g  p r e s s u r e s  
up t o  5 ,000  pounds p e r  s q u a r e  i n c h ,  would c o n t a i n  one M-X m i s s i l e .  According 
t o  t h e  A i r  F o r c e ,  S o v i e t  n u c l e a r  warheads would t end  t o  n e u t r a l i z e  each o t h e r  
(because  o f  t h e  phenomena known a s  " f r a t r i c i d e " )  and t h e o r e t i c a l l y  b e  u n a b l e  
t o  d e s t r o y  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  of  t h e  M-X f o r c e .  Some s h o r t  t ime  a f t e r  t h e  
i n i t i a l  S o v i e t  a t t a c k ,  b u t  b e f o r e  a second wave o f  S o v i e t  warheads cou ld  
a t t ack ,  t h e r e  would be a "window" ( l a s t i n g  s e v e r a l  minu tes )  th rough  which t h e  
U-S- cou ld  l aunch  t h e  M-X m i s s i l e s  t h a t  s u r v i v e d .  
CRS- 10  
a h a r d  t a r g e t  c a p a b i l i t y ,  t h e  t a r g e t i n g  o f  two warheads a g a i n s t  each  ICBM would 
g i v e  h i g h  a s s u r a n c e  of  t a r g e t  d e s t r u c t i o n .  Thus, under t h i s  assumpt ion,  t h i s  
o p t i o n  would n o t  p rov ide  f o r  ICBM s u r v i v a b i l i t y  under  t h e  Reagan p roposa l .  
Option ( 2 )  - I f  t h e  number of  s i l o s  c u r r e n t l y  e x i s t i n g  on bo th  s i d e s  a r e  
no t  reduced,  131 and t h e  s m a l l e r  number o f  ICBMs p r o j e c t e d  i n  Tab le  I a r e  deploy- -
ed among them, o p t i o n  ( 2 )  g i v e s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  l e s s  i n c e n t i v e  t h a n  o p t i o n  ( 1 )  f o r  
one n a t i o n  t o  a t t a c k  t h e  o t h e r  n a t i o n ' s  ICBMs, Assuming t h a t  two warheads a r e  
r e q u i r e d  t o  have a  h i g h  a s s u r a n c e ' o f  d e s t r o y i n g  each t a r g e t e d  ICBM, t h e n ,  t o  
a t t a c k  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o j e c t e d  U.S. I C B M  f o r c e ,  c o n s i s t i n g  of 370 Minuteman 111s 
(based i n  370 s i l o s )  and 100 M-Xs (assumed t o  be based among 630 Minuteman 
s i l o s ) ,  &/ t h e  S o v i e t s  would have t o  a t t a c k  t h e  1 ,000  U.S. ICBM s i l o s  w i t h  
2,000 of t h e i r  2,500 ICBM-launched warheads. S i m i l a r l y ,  t o  a t t a c k  t h e  e n t i r e  
p r o j e c t e d  S o v i e t  ICBM f o r c e ,  70 SS-18s (assumed t o  be based among 308 s i l o s )  
and 300 SS-19s (assumed t o  be based among 1 ,090  modif ied  s i l o s ) ,  - 15/ t h e  U.S. 
would need t o  p l a c e  on t a r g e t  2,796 warheads ( b u t  would o n l y  have 2500 ICBM 
warheads i n  i t s  f o r c e ) .  Thus, under t h e  assumpt ions  s t a t e d ,  i t  could  be argued 
t h a t  n e i t h e r  n a t i o n  would have a  s t r o n g  m i l i t a r y  i n c e n t i v e  t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  
The U.S. would n o t  have enough ICBM-launched warheads t o  t a r g e t  a l l  t h e  S o v i e t  
s i l o s ;  and t h e  S o v i e t s  would, f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  purposes ,  d e p l e t e  t h e i r  ICBM 
f o r c e  i n  a t t a c k i n g  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o j e c t e d  U.S. ICBM f o r c e .  
131 Launchers a r e  no t  counted under t h e  Reagan START proposa l .  Consequent ly ,  
h a v i G  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  more s i l o s  t h a n  ICBMs may be pe rmi t t ed .  However, i f  t h i s  
were t h e  c a s e ,  a  v e r i f i c a t i o n  p rocess  would seem d i f f i c u l t  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h a t  
would a c c u r a t e l y  count t h e  number of  m i s s i l e s  i n  s i l o s  y e t  p r e s e r v e  d e c e p t i o n  
( n e c e s s a r y  f o r  s u r v i v a b i l i t y )  a s  t o  which s i l o s  had m i s s i l e s  i n  them. 
141 T i t a n  I1 s i l o s  a r e  no t  counted because  i t  i s  assumed they  would no longer  -
e x i s t .  
151 The S o v i e t  Union c u r r e n t l y  has  1 ,398 I C B M  s i l o s ;  308 of t h e s e  s i l o s  can 
l a u n s  t h e  SS-18 and 360 can launch t h e  SS-19. I t  i s  assumed t h a t  730 o t h e r  
s i l o s  c u r r e n t l y  equipped t o  launch t h e  SS-17, SS-11, and SS-13 ICBMs would be 
modif ied  t o  launch t h e  SS-19. 
I f  ICBM accuracy  and r e l i a b i l i t y  were improved s u f f i c i e n t l y  t o  g i v e  a  
h i g h  degree  of a s s u r a n c e  t h a t  a  s i l o  cou ld  be d e s t r o y e d  w i t h  o n l y  one warhead,  
t h e n  t h e  Uni ted S t a t e s  o n l y  would need roughly  h a l f  o f  i t s  ICBM f o r c e  t o  des- 
t r o y  t h e  S o v i e t  ICBM f o r c e .  The same would h o l d  t r u e  f o r  t h e  S o v i e t  Union. 
Thus,  under t h i s  assumption,  b o t h  t h e  U.S. and S o v i e t s  may have m i l i t a r y  
i n c e n t i v e s  t o  s t r i k e  f i r s t .  
Opt ion ( 3 )  - Not enough i s  known about  t h e  A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s  p l a n  f o r  b a s i n g  
t h e  M-X t o  make s t r o n g  judgments a s  t o  whether  t h e  b a s i n g  w i l l  e n s u r e  s u r v i v a -  
b i l i t y  of t h e  U.S. ICBM f o r c e .  However, assuming t h e  c l o s e l y  spaced b a s i n g  (CSB) 
approach i s  fo l lowed ,  i t  appears  t h a t  t h e  M-X would have t h e  same s u r v i v a b i l i t y  
p r o p e r t i e s  whether  o r  n o t  t h e  Reagan START proposa l  was i n  e f f e c t .  
The s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  M-X i n  t h e  CSB mode r e l i e s  on " f r a t r i c i d e "  e f f e c t s  
of t h e  f i r s t  S o v i e t  warheads d e t o n a t e d  i n  t h e  v i c i n i t y  o f  a  group of M-X s h e l t e r s ,  
and on t h e  s t r a t e g y  o f  l aunch ing  t h e  s u r v i v i n g  M-X m i s s i l e s  a  s h o r t  t ime  a f t e r  
t h e  i n i t i a l  a t t a c k .  It must be n o t e d ,  however, t h a t  both  o f  t h e s e  mechanisms 
would be about e q u a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  r e g a r d l e s s  o f  whether  t h e  S o v i e t s  would r e t a i n  
t h e  approx imate ly  5,000 ICBM warheads c u r r e n t l y  dep loyed ,  whether t h e y  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  number of warheads s u b s t a n t i a l l y ,  o r  whether t h e y  r e d u c e  t h e  number o f  war- 
heads  t o  t h e  2,500 ICBM-warhead c e i l i n g  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  Reagan START proposa l .  
The SLBM S u r v i v a b i l i t y  I s s u e  
Some c r i t i c s  of t h e  Reagan START proposa l  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  s u r v i v a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  U.S. f l e e t  of b a l l i s t i c  m i s s i l e - l a u n c h i n g  submarines would be  reduced under  
t h e  Reagan p lan .  They contend t h a t  a  reduced number o f  SSBNs would make t h e  
sea-based l e g  of t h e  s t r a t e g i c  t r i a d  v u l n e r a b l e  t o  S o v i e t  ant i -submarine  w a r f a r e  
(ASW), and t h a t  t h e  U.S. would l o s e  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  p o r t i o n  of i t s  sea-based 
s t r a t e g i c  warheads f o r  each SSBN d e s t r o y e d  by t h e  S o v i e t s .  
Whether t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  i s  j u s t i f i e d  depends i n  p a r t  on what t h e  SSBN f l e e t  
would c o n s i s t  o f  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  i f  t h e  Reagan START p r o p o s a l  were implemented. 
For  example, i f  t h e  U.S. SSBN f l e e t  was des igned around a  T r i d e n t  I1 m i s s i l e  
t h a t  c a r r i e d  10 warheads,  and assuming t h a t  100 M-X I C B M s  were deployed and 370 
Minuteman I11 I C B M s  were r e t a i n e d ,  t h e n ,  a s  Tab le  I i l l u s t r a t e s ,  t h e  SSBN f l e e t  
could  c o n s i s t  o f  12 Ohio-class b o a t s .  - 16/  Of t h e s e ,  s i x  t o  e i g h t  would normal ly  
be a t  s e a  i n  peacetime. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  i f  t h e  U.S. deploys  t h e  T r i d e n t  I1 SLBM 
w i t h  6  warheads ,  dep loys  100 M-X m i s s i l e s  and r e t a i n s  o n l y  30 Minuteman I11 
ICBMs, then  t h e  U.S. would be al lowed t o  have 27 Ohio-class SSBNs. 171 Th i s  - 
number of  SSBNs would y i e l d  a  peacet ime deployment a t  s e a  i n  t h e  range  o f  14 t o  
18 bo2ts .  
Of t h e  two approaches  j u s t  d i s c u s s e d ,  t h e  l a t t e r  would seem t o  c o u n t e r  t h e  
c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  t h e  Reagan START p r o p o s a l  would undermine SSBN f o r c e  s u r v i v a b i -  
l i t y  s i n c e  i t  could  a l l o w  f o r  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  number of  SSBNs. It would, however, 
c o s t  c o n s i d e r a b l y  more t h a n  t h e  f i r s t  approach s i n c e  i t  i n v o l v e s  p r o c u r i n g  and 
o p e r a t i n g  many more SSBNs. 
I f  t h e  f i r s t  approach was used,  SSBN s u r v i v a b i l i t y  could  s t i l l  be an  open 
i s s u e  n o t  amenable t o  s imple  a n a l y s i s .  However, t h e  fo l lowing  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  
a r e  r e l e v a n t  : 
o  Even w i t h  a  reduced number of U.S. SSBNs, t h e  S o v i e t s  would have t o  
s e a r c h  t h e  same a r e a  of ocean,  Thus, t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  a t h a t  U.S. SSBN would be 
161 The a c t i v e  U.S. SSBN f l e e t  c u r r e n t l y  c o n s i s t s  of 31 L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s  
b o a t s a n d  one Ohio-class boa t .  Some of  t h e  P o l a r i s  SSBNs have been sc rapped ;  
o t h e r s  a r e  be ing  r e t i r e d .  
171 Assuming c u r r e n t  SSBN produc t ion  c a p a c i t y ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  t h a t  t h e  U.S. 
w o u l d b e  a b l e  t o  produce 27 Ohio-class SSBNs and 648 T r i d e n t  I1 SLBMs by t h e  
end of 1992. 
d e t e c t e d  a t  s e a  would be c o n c e p t u a l l y  about  t h e  same r e g a r d l e s s  o f  t h e  number 
of U.S. SSBNs deployed. However, i f  t h e  U.S. SSBN f l e e t  c o n s i s t s  o f  o n l y  a  few 
b o a t s ,  once t h e  S o v i e t s  f i n d  one o r  more o f  t h e  SSBNs t h e y  cou ld  c o n c e n t r a t e  a  
h i g h e r  pe rcen tage  o f  t h e i r  ASW a s s e t s  a g a i n s t  them. 
o  The l o s s  of one SSBN would r e p r e s e n t  t h e  l o s s  o f  a  much h i g h e r  p o r t i o n  
of t h e  sea-based l e g  of t h e  s t r a t e g i c  t r i a d .  I n  t h e  examples shown above 
(assuming t h a t  two-thi rds  o f  t h e  SSBN f o r c e  i s  a t  s e a ) ,  l o s s  o f  one SSBN would 
r e p r e s e n t  a  l o s s  of 12.5 p e r c e n t  of our  a t - sea  c a p a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  10-warhead 
T r i d e n t  I1 c a s e  (12 SSBNs, e i g h t  SSBNs a t  s e a ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  f o r  t h e  6-warhead 
T r i d e n t  I1 c a s e  ( 2 7  SSBNs, 18 SSBNs a t  s e a ) ,  l o s s  of one SSBN would reduce  o u r  
a t - s e a  SLBM a s s e t s  by 5.5 pe rcen t .  
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TABLE A-1 - PROJECTED U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL 
ICBMs : * 
T i t a n  I1 
Minuteman I1 
Minuteman 111 (MK-12) 




Pose idon  
( L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s )  
T r i d e n t  I 
( L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s )  
T r i d e n t  I 
(Oh io -c l a s s )  
T r i d e n t  I1 
(Ohio -c l a s s )  
Sub-Tota ls  
T o t a l s  
(100 M-X IChNs U.S. 
By t h e  end of 
1983 1984  1985  1986  1987 -----
Opt ion )  
c a l e n d a r  y e a r  
* It is p r o j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  would ( a )  r e t i r e  no l e s s  
t h a n  100 Minuteman I C B M s  p e r  y e a r  from 1984 th rough  1987 and ( b )  
r e t i r e  a l l  t h e  L a f a y e t t e - c l a s s  SS8Ns by t h e  end of 1990.  Ohio- 




TABLE A-I1 - PROJECTED U.S. ICBMISLBM DEPLOYED WARHEADS UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL 
(100 M-X ICBMs U.S. Option) 
By the end of calendar year 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 ----- ,- ___ ---
ICBMs : 
Titan I1 52 52 52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Minuteman I1 450 350 250 125 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12) 750 750 750 750 675 330 330 330 300 210 
Minuteman 111 (3 MK-12A) 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
M-X (lo MK-12A) 0 0 0 250 750 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
- -  I_---- 
Sub-Totals 2152 2052 1952 2025 2325 2230 2230 2230 2200 2110 . 
SLBMs : 
Poseidon (9 Warheads) 2736 2160 1584 576 0 
Trident I (8 Warheads) 2112 2496 2688 3072 3008 
Trident 11 (10 MK-12A) 0 0 0 0 0  
----- 
Sub-Totals 4948 4656 4272 3648 3008 
----- 
Totals 7000 6708 6224 5673 5333 
----- 
APPENDIX A 
(Cont inued)  
TABLE A-111 - PROJECTED SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL 
By t h e  end of c a l e n d a r  y e a r  
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1992 ----- ----- 
ICBMs : * 
SS-18(10Warheads )  100 100 100 100 98 70 7 0 70 70 70 
S S - 1 8 ( 8 W a r h e a d s )  150 150 150 150 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SS-18 ( 1  Warhead) 58 58 58 58 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S S - l g ( 6 W a r h e a d s )  300 300 300 300 300 300 30U 300 300 300 
SS-19 ( 1  Warhead) 60 60 60 40 0 0 0 0 Ci 0 
SS-17 ( 4  Warheads) 120 120  120 U 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SS-17 ( 1  Warhead) 32 32 32 0 0 0 0 U 0 0 
SS-13 ( 1  Warhead) 60 60 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SS-11 ( 1  Warhead) 518 268 18 0 0 u 0 0 0 0 
----- ----- 
Sub-Totals 1398 1148 898 648 398 370 370 370 370 370 
SLBMs : * 
SS-N-20 (Typhoon) 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
SS-N-18 ( D e l t a  111)  240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 
SS-N-6 (Yankee I )  304 224 160 96 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Sub-Totals 950 850 750 650 548 472 472 472 472 472 
T o t a l s  2348 1998 1648 1298 946 842 842 842 842 842 
* It is  p r o j e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  S o v i e t s  would r e t i r e  no l e s s  than  250 I C B M s  
and 100 SLBMs per  y e a r  s t a r t i n g  i n  1984. 
APPENDIX A 
(Concluded) 
TABLE A-IV - PROJECTED SOVIET ICBMISLBM DEPLOYED WARHEADS UNDER THE REAGAN PROPOSAL 
By t h e  end of c a l e n d a r  y e a r  
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991  1992 ----- _I_ ----
ICBMs : 
SS-18 (10 Warheads) 
SS-18 ( 8  Warheads) 
SS-18 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-19 ( 6  Warheads) 
SS-19 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-17 (4  Warheads) 
SS-17 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-13 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-11 ( 1  Warhead) 
Sub-Totals 
SLBMs : 
SS-N-20 (10 Warheads) 
SS-N-18 ( 7  Warheads) 
SS-N-17 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-N-8 ( 1  Warhead) 
SS-N-6 ( 1  Warhead) 
Sub-Totals 
T o t a l s  

